

STUDY REPORT

MOBILE STRIKE FORCE 95 OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) ANALYSIS

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TRADOC Analysis Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5200

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TRADOC Analysis Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5200

MOBILE STRIKE FORCE 95 OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) ANALYSIS STUDY REPORT

by
David L. Fuller



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ABSTRACT

This report contains the analysis of the Mobile Strike Force (MSF) capability of performing operations other than war (OOTW) missions. This analysis supports the Prairie Warrior/Mobile Strike Force (PW/MSF) 1995 Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) Organizational and Operational (O&O) analysis by addressing the question: "Is the Mobile Strike Force capable of performing OOTW missions such as peace enforcement in the European Command (EUCOM) and disaster relief such as Hurricane Andrew?" If an MSF task-organized for combat cannot perform OOTW operations without extensive augmentation or reorganization, the U.S. will have added another special purpose force that may not be able to contribute in the most frequent applications of U.S. military capability. This study considers how MSF could, or should, be involved with 2 of the 13 military OOTW situations: peace enforcement and disaster relief. The Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC) assembled a group of subject-matter experts from proponent schools and centers to role-play the MSF staff. TRAC used a seminar workshop to wargame a European peace enforcement scenario and a domestic disaster relief scenario.

Mobile Strike Force (MSF)
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Peace Enforcement and Disaster Relief Analysis
Study Report

1. **Purpose.** This report contains the analysis of the Mobile Strike Force's (MSF) capability of performing operations other than war (OOTW) missions such as peace enforcement and disaster relief. The analysis is based on input gained from a seminar workshop held during 2-5 May 1995 and a Janus wargaming scenario preparation conducted in June 1995. The seminar provided analytical insights for both OOTW missions, while the Janus wargaming preparation was used to provide additional analytical insights for the peace enforcement scenario.

2. **Participants.** The workshop was hosted by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC). Participants included representatives from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the Infantry, Engineer, Military Police (MP), and Judge Advocate General (JAG) Schools; the Armor, Aviation, and Intelligence Centers; the Chaplain School and Center; the Medical School and Center; the Combat Service Support Battle Laboratory (CSSBL); the Battle Command Battle Laboratory (BCBL); elements of the 82d Airborne (Abn) Division; the 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group; the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Bn), elements of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) (the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) and Threats Support Directorate); and elements of the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) (Military Law, Concept and Doctrine Directorate, and the OOTW Team). TRAC participants included representatives from TRAC's Study and Analysis Center (SAC), Operational Analysis Center (OAC), Scenario and Wargaming Center (SWC), and TRAC-Fort Lee (LEE).

3. **Background.**

a. Problem statement. Can the MSF be task-organized to perform OOTW missions such as peace enforcement in the European Command (EUCOM) and Hurricane Andrew-type disaster relief without augmentation or reorganization? If not, what are the organizational or augmentation implications?

b. Background of problem. The United States is transitioning from the industrial age to the information age; from a cold war containment strategy to a regional force projection strategy; and from facing a clearly defined threat to being confronted by a myriad of ill-defined threats. This transition requires a top-to-bottom examination of the Army (Force XXI). One of the established design principles for Force XXI is that it be effective in war and operations other than war. The definition of "operations other than war" covers a broad spectrum. OOTW are designed to promote regional stability, maintain or achieve democratic end states, retain U.S. influence and access abroad, provide assistance to distressed areas, protect U.S. interests, and assist U.S. civil authorities. Doctrine on OOTW is presented in field manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, and in FM 100-25, *Peace Operations* (which lists 13 different OOTW activities). This study considers how the MSF could, or should, support 2 of these 13 situations: peace enforcement and disaster relief.

c. *Impact of problem.* If an MSF task-organized for combat cannot perform OOTW operations without extensive augmentation or reorganization, the U.S. will have added another special purpose force that may not be able to contribute in the most frequent applications of U.S. military capability.

d. *Objectives.* This analysis supports the Prairie Warrior/Mobile Strike Force (PW/MSF) 1995 Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) Organizational and Operational (O&O) Analysis by addressing the following question: ***"Is the Mobile Strike Force capable of performing Operations Other than War (OOTW) missions such as peace enforcement in EUCOM and disaster relief such as Hurricane Andrew?"*** In addressing this question, it helps to meet the following objectives:

- (1) To assess division-level Force XXI design principles.
- (2) To assess division-level Force XXI operational concepts.
- (3) To assess division-level Force XXI combat service support (CSS) concepts and requirements.

4. **Assumptions/limitations.**

a. *Assumptions.*

- (1) Projected 2010 technological capabilities and data used in this analysis are valid.
- (2) Threat organizational, materiel, and doctrinal projections are accurate for the 2010 time frame.
- (3) Scenarios used in this analysis are representative of those in which a Force XXI division might be employed.

b. *Limitations.*

- (1) The nature of the seminar workshop provided only subjective data for analysis of systems or task organizations for forces in the OOTW situations.
- (2) The subject-matter experts (SME) at the seminar provided responses to events. The SMEs were asked to look only at a small sampling of possible events which could take place in OOTW situations. The events used are by no means all-inclusive.
- (3) The analyses in this study are limited to two specific OOTW events: peace enforcement (refugee camp relief) and disaster relief (Hurricane Andrew disaster).
- (4) Because of the nature of the seminar workshop, this analysis was exploratory in nature and points only toward general trends for OOTW situations.

5. Study issues.

- a. Is the MSF capable of performing OOTW missions such as peace enforcement in EUCOM?
- b. Is the MSF capable of conducting operations such as Hurricane Andrew disaster relief?

6. Essential elements of analysis (EEA).

a. *Peace enforcement EEAs.* The following EEAs were used for the peace enforcement in the EUCOM scenario. Most of the EEAs listed for study issue 1 were answered through the OOTW MSF seminar workshop. The EEAs that were not completely answered through the seminar were further answered by using the Janus-gamed scenarios. It was not necessary to completely regame these scenarios. Using MSF, the analyst were able to answer the EEAs by the same process used in the preparation for Janus gaming.

- (1) EEA 1. How does the Army determine MSF composition requirements for a particular peace enforcement mission?
- (2) EEA 2. What are the CS requirements of the MSF in peace enforcement operations?
- (3) EEA 3. What are the C2 requirements of the MSF in peace enforcement operations?
- (4) EEA 4. What are the special equipment and procedure requirements of the MSF in peace enforcement operations?
- (5) EEA 5. What are the special liaison requirements of the MSF in peace enforcement operations?
- (6) EEA 6. What are the logistics implications of multinational peace enforcement operations on the MSF?
- (7) EEA 7. How quickly can MSF units respond to a peace enforcement mission?
- (8) EEA 8. What are the sortie requirements to sustain an MSF unit?
- (9) EEA 9. What additional assets not organic to the MSF are required for peace enforcement operations?
- (10) EEA 10. What are the ROE issues in peace enforcement for MSF units?
- (11) EEA 11. What are the augmentation requirements for MSF peace enforcement operations?

(12) EEA 12. How can the MSF reduce risk and casualties?

(13) EEA 13. How does the MSF disengage from a peace enforcement operation?

b. *Hurricane Andrew disaster relief EEAs*. The following EEAs helped lead the discussion in the OOTW MSF seminar workshop and were used to evaluate the MSF capabilities in a Hurricane Andrew-style disaster relief effort.

(1) EEA 14. What is the determining process that dictates the uses of the MSF for a disaster relief situation?

(2) EEA 15. What are the peculiar C2 requirements for the MSF in disaster relief efforts?

(3) EEA 16. How do units composing the MSF train to prepare for disaster relief situations?

(4) EEA 17. How does the MSF help provide medical and veterinary services, sanitation, and water purification services associated with disasters?

(5) EEA 18. What engineer assets does the MSF require to do this mission?

(6) EEA 19. How does the MSF provide help with public affairs, civil affairs (CA), food services, supply distribution, and reestablish an infrastructure after a disaster?

7. Scenarios.

a. *Peace enforcement.*

(1) The context scenarios for the peace enforcement HRS were drawn from EUCOM 3.0. It provided the initial assumptions, road to war, threat forces, and the U.S. forces' concept of operation. EUCOM 3.0 served as the low-resolution context and theater perspective for HRS 49.0, 50.0, and 51.0. These scenarios depict a Blue battalion combat team conducting early entry operations against Red paramilitary forces. The force structures for these scenarios are Blue Army of Excellence (AOE) and Red 2006. HRS 49.0 and 50.0 were modeled in Janus at TRAC-SWC, and their findings are found in a separate document. The first part of this workshop was the development of HRS 51.0, utilizing a table-top wargaming seminar at TRAC-SWC.

(2) Opposed Early Entry (Night) (HRS 49.0) and Route Clearance (Night) (HRS 50.0) provided the means to enter the country and locate the refugee camp. Relief of Refugee Camp (HRS 51.0) focused on the composite task force assigned the refugee relief mission. Red forces were limited to psychological campaigns against the U.S. and two- to three-man teams conducting terrorist attacks against high payoff targets. The host nation has been overwhelmed with refugees and requests assistance. The scenario primarily exercised the combat support (CS) and CSS functions in an OOTW situation. The scenario included five major events, with one event having two parts. The task force, initially tailored for combat, was augmented with

additional assets in order to conduct the humanitarian assistance mission. The focus of the Blue task force was to feed and provide medical/sanitation services, shelter, and security. The mission was handed off to non-U.S. forces after approximately 14 days.

(3) Scenario events and responses.

(a) The scenario began with the composite task force arriving at the refugee camp and finding the local and refugee populations armed. The Blue forces, along with the host nation forces, secured the weapons and created an environment that was conducive to the conduct of relief operations.

(b) On day 2, a U.S. soldier shot a civilian during the collection of weapons. The soldier was evacuated and the Blue forces used CA and PSYOP personnel to mitigate the effects.

(c) On day 3, a Blue convoy was stopped by highway bandits who had established a false check point. The bandits demanded food in return for safe passage through a minefield. The Blue forces sent out a security element with engineers to allow the convoy to continue its mission. Those manning the check point were taken into custody by the host nation.

(d) On day 7, 300 refugees got sick from the food (meals, ready-to-eat (MRE)) provided by the Blue-led relief effort. The refugees perceived this as a poisoning and prepared to riot. The Blue forces deployed medics with additional security to treat the personnel already affected, and to check the other lots of MREs. CA and PSYOP personnel were used to inform and to mitigate effects. The quick-reaction force (QRF) at the camp was alerted, but never called into action.

(e) On day 10, at 1330 hours, a piece of Blue force engineer equipment collided into a school while returning from a mission. Part of the school collapsed and injured two children. A crowd formed around the vehicle, pulled the operator out, and beat him. The Blue force evacuated the soldier after he was treated. The JAG claims section and engineers repaired the damage, while PSYOP personnel were used to mitigate the event.

(e) Also on day 10 at 1815 hours, one of the Blue force engineer soldiers struck a refugee. The incident was captured on film by a press representative. The Blue force removed the soldier from the area of operations. The public affairs office (PAO), CA, and PSYOP representatives were used to mitigate events. The Provost Marshall (PM) conducted an investigation of the event.

(f) On day 12, a Blue tanker ran over a mine. The driver was killed and 2,000 gallons of fuel were dumped into the local water supply. The Blue forces used the PM cell to secure the scene so that engineers could begin work. The engineers cleaned up the spill and diverted the contaminated water supply. The local populace was given water and the claims commission handled all the claims.

b. Disaster relief.

(1) There was no standard scenario available to use as a base case for disaster relief analysis. After investigating at several different disaster situations, it was decided to use the well documented case of Hurricane Andrew which hit the southern tip of Florida in August 1992 as a reference or base case. [Hurricane Andrew was the third strongest hurricane to hit the U.S. in this century and was the nation's costliest natural disaster. It raced across the southern tip of Florida at 20 miles per hour, slicing a path 60 miles long and 25 miles wide. Over 80,000 dwellings were demolished or severely damaged and another 55,000 dwellings were partially damaged but still considered livable. This zone of devastation was larger than the city of Chicago (or equal to 12 Manhattan Islands totaling more than \$30 billions damage to property).]

(2) A brigade from the 82nd Abn was deployed to the disaster area. The brigade area of operation (AO) was organized into battalion-level AOs for command and control (C2). These battalions further designated company AOs, with each company based on a public facility such as a school. Most of the public buildings were older and they withstood the hurricane fairly well. These areas also had an associated ball field or recreation area suitable for bivouacking the company and for setting up mobile kitchen trailers (MKT), a landing zone (LZ), and tents for other relief agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Red Cross, etc. These locations were called company hubs and were the focal point of relief efforts. The operation was not federalized so local officials were in charge. Federal troops could not arrest nor even "monitor" civilians. Gangs were a major problem and there was looting prior to the brigade's arrival. Brigade soldiers had weapons up to M-60s, but all ammunition was stored at the arrival airfield in the brigade field trains. Rules of engagement (ROE) permitted the use of force only to protect federal property and in situations which posed a threat to loss of life. Only the joint task force (JTF) commander could authorize distribution of ammunition, to include riot control agents.

(3) Scenario events and responses.

(a) Hurricane Andrew II has hit the southern tip of Florida. The 82d Abn is deployed overseas and unavailable for immediate deployment for assistance. The Hurricane cuts a 25-mile path, demolishing 80,000 homes and leaving 300,000 homeless. The zone of devastation is larger than the city of Chicago. MSF was tasked to provide relief. Additional assets would be augmented to them as required. Worse-casing the situation, a Blue force was task-organized using MSF assets and requesting additional support for more military police (MP), CA, PSYOP, and engineers. The assumption was made that these forces were available and could be deployed from their home station to southern Florida.

(b) A new school being used as a hurricane shelter collapsed, trapping hundreds. Survivors were frantically looking for relatives and loved ones. The local fire departments and police could not handle the situation and requested support from the military. MPs were used to help control the area, engineers provided structural analysis and heavy equipment, infantry were used to help remove rubble and debris, and CA provided the military interface with the local authorities and agencies.

(c) Wild animals escaped from various laboratories and zoo animals roamed the area posing a threat to the local population. Some of the laboratory animals were being used for Auto-Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) experiments. "Shoot-to-kill" orders were given from the laboratories, but representatives from People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) interfered with the collection of these animals. The military stayed out of the operation for the most part but reported information to the police and tracked loose animals, if encountered. PSYOP was used to disseminate information and the PAO coordinated with the press. This was not a proper mission for the U.S. military. The military stayed out of the "Jungle Warfare."

(d) A local radio announced that the Army units did not have ammunition. Gangs tested this by stealing a high-mobility, multi-purpose, wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) and a truck full of supplies. The gang members, wearing battle dress uniforms (BDU), tried to sell the food and supplies to illegal aliens, criminal elements, and those mistrustful of uniformed authorities. The Army had no authority and had to interface with local law enforcement and national guard personnel. The Army could not collect intelligence on U.S. citizens but could maintain surveillance on their own AOs. MPs (with ammunition) were put in place to control access at company hubs and air surveillance began for all AOs.

(4) The following is a summary of the commander's intent for the operation.

(a) Provide essential life support needs to the people.

(b) Maintain a highly visible profile in the neighborhoods.

(c) Stabilize the situation so that local and state agencies were able to assume the operation (desired end-state).

(d) Redeploy the brigade back to Ft. Bragg (the JTF commander defined "success" as early redeployment).

8. Method of analysis.

a. General. TRAC-SWC examined the MSF (MSF organization depicted in figure 1) in the OOTW context of a peace enforcement mission in a EUCOM scenario and a disaster relief/humanitarian assistance mission in a Hurricane Andrew scenario. The two OOTW situations are independent and, initially, it was thought that they would require very different methods of analysis. However, the workshop proved to be a very good method for analyzing both study issues and made it unnecessary to completely regame HRS 49 and 50 using the Janus model.




Figure 1. MSF organization

b. Description of methodology. The methodology used for the OOTW analysis is depicted in figure 2. It was modified slightly from that originally planned and documented in the study plan to capitalize on expertise provided by SMEs. The following is a point-by-point discussion of the process as graphically shown in figure 2.




Figure 2. Methodology used for MSF OOTW analysis

(1) Develop peace enforcement and disaster relief events to be used in the seminar workshop. Coordination was made with the scenario production officer to ensure the peace enforcement scenario (Relief of Refugee Camp (HRS 51.0)), answered as many EEAs as possible.

The events for the disaster relief were developed with the help from the actual operations officer who was assigned to the Hurricane Andrew disaster relief effort.

(2) Seminar: Employment of Task-Organized MSF. At the conclusion of the first part of the seminar, (Relief of Refugee Camp (HRS 51.0)), the SMEs from the various battle laboratories and schools were introduced to MSF and asked how they would task-organize the MSF to conduct the same operation of providing relief to a refugee camp. Following that, a more in-depth exercise was conducted to address how the MSF should be task-organized to support a disaster relief situation such as Hurricane Andrew. The seminar participants were given an event list of situations and asked, given their experiences and expertise, how they would task-organize the MSF to meet the requirements from the list.

(a) The week-long wargaming seminar consisted of two parts. Part I lasted for a day and a half and concentrated on the development of a standard high-resolution scenario (HRS), Relief of a Refugee Camp (HRS 51.0). Part II, also lasting a day and a half, was divided into two periods. The first period looked at the scenario developed during the first part of the week by asking the seminar participants to develop a force tasked-organized to perform the same mission using the MSF. The second period concentrated on executing the Hurricane Andrew type disaster relief mission using a task-organized MSF. The methodology used in the workshop will be discussed in a later section.

(b) The seminar was a multi-sided, free play simulation, with each player assigned to one of four teams. These teams/players assumed a role to represent the views, positions, and actions of those responsible for humanitarian assistance operations in the region. Players also assumed the roles of the host nation, local officials, and humanitarian assistance adversaries.

1. The four teams were much like they would be in the "real world", but operated in a compressed time frame. Game play proceeded through the interaction of players or teams as they assessed the scenario, developed options and recommendations, and coordinated interagency and host nation actions or operations. The four teams (Red, Blue, Green, Control) each had a unique collection of personnel and agencies. All personnel on a team shared intelligence and maintained a common perspective of other personnel on that team.
2. The Blue team represented the branches and functions of the Army. It worked in direct coordination with the Green team, which represented the host nation, local populace, local officials, and governmental and non-governmental organizations. The Red team represented all those opposed to the humanitarian assistance mission. All other roles were the function of the Control team, which acted as those agencies, organizations, countries, and higher authorities who were not explicitly represented in the game. The Control team and the Red team formed one cell.
3. Each team had a designated leader responsible for presiding over team discussions, ensuring that the objectives and tasks for each event were fulfilled and kept on schedule. The team leader established a uniform relationship, friend or enemy,

between personnel on his team and those on other teams. The team leader held the senior role player position for the team.

4. Each team was assigned a facilitator who was collocated with the team and served as the Control cell's representative for the team. He was available to answer questions on game process, rules, and scenario interpretation. He intervened only to ensure that the players stayed on schedule, observed game rules, and fulfilled their deliverable requirements. He worked closely with the team leader.

(3) OOTW analysis. After the workshop, analysis was conducted by compiling the SMEs' responses to the different events. This analysis was used to answer the EEAs and the events were developed so they would provide insights to the EEAs. Although not all of the EEAs were answered as a result of the seminar, more EEAs were fully answered by the SMEs than had been anticipated. The peace enforcement EEAs that were not fully answered were evaluated by a SWC production team using the same methodology used to prepare for the gaming of a scenario with Janus.

(4) Emerging results. Immediately following the workshop, emerging insights were provided to the TRAC leadership. These emerging results were incorporated with Prairie Warrior and other O&O MSF insights into a briefing of emerging results of the Prairie Warrior/Mobile Strike Force 1995 AWE.

(5) EEAs answered? EEAs answered by the seminar were incorporated into the final report. Those EEAs not completely answered by the seminar were more closely evaluated by the scenario production team.

(6) Peace enforcement requirements not answered in seminar. The workshop answered many of the peace enforcement EEAs which the analysts initially thought would require Janus gaming. However, there were still some of the EEAs that were not completely answered and needed additional analysis. These EEAs were presented to the SWC production team for further analysis.

(7) Develop task organization of MSF for OOTW. Using HRS 49 and HRS 50, it was determined how MSF would, or could, be used to perform the same operations. Using the MSF, task organizations were developed for both scenarios to determine deployment, sustainment, and maintenance. This is the process SWC used in creating a force listing for the Janus model.

(8) Need additional systems? If the MSF contains all assets to accomplish the mission, continue to complete the final analysis. If, however, additional assets are required, those assets will need to be provided by the supporting corps.

(9) Additional corps augmentations. If the MSF did not have organic systems to accomplish the mission, the corps provided the required assets. Use of corps assets ensured that the task-organized MSF could accomplish the units' mission. Needed assets not organic to MSF were obtained from corps. These assets were identified and added to the forces which could be

used in the regaming of the scenario in Janus if at some point that became a requirement. After developing the additional force augmentations and evaluation of the EEAs, it was determined that additional gaming would not provide any additional analytical insights.

(10) OOTW analysis. This analysis completed the evaluation of the EEAs. It provided more thorough answers for some EEAs than the workshop. These answers from the SMEs provide general trends for the different EEAs.

(11) MSF OOTW study report. This MSF OOTW study report was produced as a stand-alone document; however, its results were also incorporated into the MSF 95 O&O Analysis final report. This OOTW report will combine the results of the Janus gaming of the two scenarios using MSF and the seminar results.

(12) Scripted brief. TRAC-SWC will develop a scripted brief of the OOTW analysis which will be incorporated into the O&O analysis scripted brief due to the Battle Laboratory Integration and Technology Directorate for Combat Developments (BLITCD) for the October 1995 Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) Board of Directors (BOD) meeting.

9. **Summary of findings by issue and EEA.** This section takes the observations and insights made by the SMEs at the seminar wargaming workshop and relates them to the issues and EEAs developed for this analysis. Supportable findings from this analysis for each EEA are presented.

a. *"Is the MSF capable of performing OOTW missions such as peace enforcement in EUCOM?"*

(1) EEA 1. How does the Army determine MSF composition requirements for a particular peace enforcement mission? Peace enforcement operations are sometimes beyond the United Nation's (UN) ability to command, control, and plan. The U.S. National Command authorities determine when U.S. forces will be involved in peace enforcement operations. Once command authorities have determined that the U.S. will send forces and the commander-in-chief (CINC) from that region has been notified, a mission analysis is conducted and plans are developed. The mission analysis and plans determine the requirements and the task organization for an operation.

(2) EEA 2. What are the combat support requirements of MSF in peace enforcement operations? The MSF combat support requirement for the refugee camp relief scenario are: one MP company with a PM; one PSYOP task force (TF) (-); one CA tactical planning team; a military intelligence (MI) group with three interrogation teams, two counterintelligence teams, and one Trojan Spirit (an information relay station); engineers with one corps wheeled battalion and one combat support company; a field artillery counterfire radar; and one aviation assault battalion (-) in general support containing one contact team, six lift helicopters, and six attack helicopters.

(3) EEA 3. What are the C2 requirements of MSF in peace enforcement operations? Each peace enforcement operation could require a different sized element for C2. For the refugee

camp relief scenario, a light infantry brigade headquarters (-) was used. After evaluating MSF, the SMEs at the seminar also task-organized the light infantry brigade headquarters for this mission. Using advanced technologies, MSF may exercise C2 more effectively and with greater accuracy.

(4) EEA 4. *What are the special equipment and procedure requirements of MSF in peace enforcement operations?* In this scenario, a light airfield repair package was required to repair the runway and ramps of the airfield used to bring in troop and supplies. This would not be needed in every OOTW situation, but the conditions and capabilities of the point of entry need to be considered when planning for these operations. In addition to the repair package for the airfield, a prime power platoon and a construction team would be required for the refugee camp.

(5) EEA 5. *What are the special liaison requirements of MSF in peace enforcement operations?* There are no special liaison requirements for the MSF in peace enforcement operations. A liaison and coordination center must ensure cooperative action between concerned parties and have the ability to communicate in the combined partners' native languages -- enhancing and facilitating the activities of the forces involved. This would be true for any unit in a peace enforcement situation and is not limited to MSF.

(6) EEA 6. *What are the logistics implications of multinational peace enforcement operations on MSF?* The MSF units should plan to be self-sufficient while conducting peace enforcement operations. Because of the complexity of peace enforcement, the assignment and rotation of logistics personnel should be staggered to maintain proficiency and continuity in sustaining the force. Plans should be made to provide logistics support to coalition forces. Many countries that provide soldiers for peace operations may turn to the U.S. for support when their own country (or the UN) fails to provide basic CSS services. The U.S. units should plan on being completely self-sufficient for Class I support. UN health and sanitation requirements for the contract of Class I may not meet U.S. sanitation requirements.

(7) EEA 7. *How quickly can MSF units respond to a peace enforcement mission?* Since the MSF is an experimental element, it is difficult to know where these forces would be located in relation to each other. MSF, in design, is a force that can react very quickly and respond to situations as needed. MSF has an air assault group with light infantry and lift helicopters to move quickly to an objective. MSF is organized by brigade-sized modular units, which have their own logistics units plus a mobile support group for the other MSF units.

(8) EEA 8. *What are the sortie requirements to sustain an MSF unit?* MSF has its own logistical support and is self-sufficient for three to five days. Sustainment requirements will vary, depending on the size of force used for an operation and for providing supplies for refugees. The MSF, its higher headquarters, and the U.S. Transportation Command, would determine by what means forces will be deployed. They would determine the number of sorties and/or ships required to deploy and sustain forces.

(9) EEA 9. *What additional assets not organic to MSF are required for peace enforcement operations?* Each peace enforcement operation would be different and each would

have different requirements; however, additional medical, engineer, and CA units were required to augment the MSF for this scenario. This scenario would require an additional combat service hospital (-), preventative medicine, veterinary services, and increased sanitation capability. Engineers required a contracting team and a prime power platoon and CA required a tactical planning team.

(10) **EEA 10. *What are the rules of engagement issues in peace enforcement for MSF units?*** The ROE or rules of interaction are not different for the MSF than they are for other forces. Soldiers must know and understand the ROE. The degree of force used must only be sufficient to achieve that task at hand and prevent, as far as possible, loss of human life and/or serious injury. Leaders must ensure that soldiers are not limited by the ROE in their ability to defend themselves. Leaders should develop and issue to all soldiers a single card that clearly outlines the ROE for reference, keeping in mind that the card in itself is not the answer. The ROE must be realistic, simple, easy to understand, and known. The formulation of ROE should consider the cultural differences of multinational forces.

(11) **EEA 11. *What are the augmentation requirements for MSF peace enforcement operations?*** Each peace enforcement operation would be different and each would have unique requirements. In this scenario, additional assets were required from corps, special operations, and other services. Additional engineer assets from corps were required to repair an airfield and to establish better facilities at the refugee camp. The corps also provided additional medical assets with preventive medicine, veterinary services, and increased sanitation capability. The CA units were provided from the special operations command to assist in coordinating with the host nation and the local population. As previously stated, different operations will require unique augmentations. This scenario, as in most others, required Air Force and Navy assets to transport Army units to staging areas. The number of Air Force and Naval assets required to move Army units would depend on the size of the operation.

(12) **EEA 12. *How can MSF reduce risk and casualties?*** MSF does not reduce risk because of any single asset. However, it has a better unity of command because it has more organic assets and they link together digitally. In some areas, MSF has an advantage in the likelihood of casualties. An air assault force uses more airframes (helicopters), thus spreading forces out over more platforms. Some SMEs felt this as a plus while others saw this as a slower and more risky method of taking an airfield. Air assaulting, as opposed to air dropping a Q36 radar (a counterfire radar), allows for a much faster setup time, thus providing better response to mortar fire. MSF air assault allows for a faster Q36 radar setup, but it does not allow for the armored gun system (AGS) to be employed in the initial assault because they cannot be transported by helicopters. Compared to today's units and those in the base case scenario, MSF has better sensors.

(13) **EEA 13. *How does MSF disengage from a peace enforcement operation?*** MSF disengages from a peace enforcement operation the same as any U.S. force would. The difference is that the MSF, having more of its own aviation assets, can disengage without the use of nonorganic assets. If the objectives of the operation have not been met, the orders can be changed. In this scenario, the status of the environment or situation of the refugee camp at the

time of the planned disengagement would determine how and when the MSF would disengage. The original plan was for the U.S. forces (MSF) to help the host nation regain control of the refugee camp and then to relinquish the operation of the camp after 14 days to either the host nation or to UN forces. As some assets complete their mission, they would disengage. At this point, the airfield would be secured and these assets could either fly out on planes bringing supplies in or be lifted out by the organic aviation assets that initially deployed them.

(14) Summary. Each peace enforcement operation is different with its own unique problems and situations. These will involve the use of armed forces to separate combatants and to create a cease-fire. Forces may also be used to create peaceful safe havens for victims of hostilities, as in this scenario. Since a peace enforcement force may resort to the use of arms against rebels or other belligerents, it must deploy with enough military strength to achieve the objectives set by political authorities. An MSF-type force contains the required range of military capabilities that meet or exceed that of the belligerents.

b. *"Is MSF capable of conducting operations such as Hurricane Andrew disaster relief?"*

(1) EEA 14. *What is the determining process that dictates the uses of MSF for a disaster relief situation?* The American public has come to expect Army support during times of critical needs. The type and kind of support differs, depending on if the disaster is foreign or domestic. The analysis in this study is confined to a domestic disaster mirroring the Hurricane Andrew disaster. Prior to or immediately following a disaster, a state's Emergency Operations Center will gather information, assess damage, and advise the governor. When the severity of a situation exceeds local and state capabilities, a governor can request the President to declare a disaster, which leads to the commitment of federal resources. When this takes place, FEMA must publish an order directing execution of the Federal Response Plan. This provides a starting point for FEMA, in coordination with the Department of Defense's (DoD) Director of Military Support, to announce an overall mission statement, provide parameters of success, and specify the required end state. Selected CINCs have domestic support responsibilities. Specific CINC responsibilities for assistance missions are identified in appropriate DoD directives, guidelines, and operational plans. The Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is appointed by a CINC to serve as the DoD single point of contact to the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for providing DoD resources during disaster assistance. The DCO collocates with the FCO and coordinates all FEMA mission assignments for military support. The DCO usually has operational control of all DoD forces deployed to support the federal effort. The DCO may ask for some or all support to come from MSF with additional augmentations as required.

(2) EEA 15. *What are the peculiar C2 requirements for MSF in disaster relief efforts?* The decision to deploy the MSF division headquarters is critical to success. This level of headquarters is resourced to respond to actions (such as liaison with civil governments and agencies, coordinate logistics for disaster assistance) and can sustain military forces. A division headquarters has assets and experience to orchestrate public affairs operations, engineering demands, and the organization to provide the C2 for the tactical units supporting the operation. They also can:

(a) Collocate command posts in or near government buildings.

(b) Provide full-time liaison officers to all government agencies for coordination.

(c) Use well-known locations such as schools or shopping centers for battalion and company-level command posts.

(3) **EEA 16. *How do units composing the MSF train to prepare for disaster relief situations?*** The training required for OOTW is not unique to MSF units. Specific training would include teaching nonengineer units to use equipment for clearing and removal of debris. These units may also receive training in the location, extrication, and provision of immediate medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures. Currently, military working dogs are not trained for search and rescue, but this could be an opportunity for military personnel to work with nonmilitary dogs and their handlers. CA, PSYOP, and JAG could prepare training information to assist in awareness of human rights and provide a list of "do's and don'ts".

(4) **EEA 17. *How does MSF help provide medical and veterinary services, sanitation, and water purification services associated with disasters?*** Area medical coverage can be provided by using divisional assets and supporting medical companies from the medical brigade. Medical support can be drawn down as civilian sources are reestablished. Medical units need to be prepared to provide pediatric and geriatric support. Units responding to disaster missions should establish a list of common pediatric and geriatric medication for use. Medical personnel must understand who can be treated in military facilities during a disaster situation and legal positions for providing medical support during disasters should be included in the medical annex of units operations orders.

(5) **EEA 18. *What engineer assets does MSF require to do this mission?*** In a disaster relief situation of the magnitude of Hurricane Andrew, more engineer equipment would be required than the MSF has available. In addition to the engineer assets, the MSF would require one prime power platoon, three firefighting detachments and two combat heavy battalions.

(6) **EEA 19. *How does MSF provide help with public affairs, civil affairs, food services, supply distribution, and reestablishing an infrastructure after a disaster?***

(a) Public affairs personnel provide timely information on the activities of all uniformed services. Their early deployment would mean early management of crisis information. They should be collocated with the civilian leaders in affected areas whenever possible, forming a PAO. The PAO would require special logistical support, such as televisions, video camera recorders (VCR), fax machines, and dedicated phone and fax lines. Also, combining PAO and PSYOP personnel will help to avoid negative publicity by the media.

(b) CA would require one tactical planning team to aid in working with the local authorities to reestablish the infrastructure after a disaster.

(c) The military can provide excellent support to the civilian agencies who are unable to control and organize massive shipments of donated supplies.

(7) Summary. As in the peace enforcement scenario, each disaster relief operation would be different, with its own unique problems and situations. These situations and problems most likely will not require a large, powerful combat force with all the capabilities of the MSF. However, military forces can provide major disaster assistance very quickly. The MSF would have equipment, personnel, logistics, and the C2 structure that could move into an area after a disaster to provide immediate stability and security.

10. **Conclusions.** This section presents the overall conclusions which can be made based on the findings captured during the week-long wargaming seminar workshop, as described above.

a. The majority of capabilities needed for OOTW are organic to the MSF. A detailed mission analysis, however, is necessary before deployment to determine mission requirements, such as: special equipment, language, preventive medicine, veterinary sanitation, and dietary restrictions. The MSF will almost certainly require augmentation of additional assets to successfully accomplish some missions. Augmentation was required for both OOTW scenarios in this study.

b. The MSF is capable of being task-organized for OOTW missions such as peace enforcement and disaster relief missions. MSF has many capabilities that will never be needed or used in most OOTW situations; however, some OOTW missions will stress the CS and CSS functions to their fullest. The peace enforcement scenario used in this study used all the engineers, medical, MP, military intelligence, and PSYOP assets in MSF and required additional CA, engineers, and medical assets to meet the mission requirements. The disaster relief scenario used all the engineers, medical, and MP assets as well. This scenario also required augmentation of more medical, CA, and engineer assets not available in the MSF.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

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APPENDIX B


MOBILE STRIKE FORCE (MSF) 95 OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (OOTW) ANALYSIS STUDY PLAN

United States Army
TRADOC Analysis Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-5200


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**Mobile Strike Force (MSF)
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Peace Enforcement and Disaster Relief Analysis
Study Plan**

1. **Purpose.** This analysis is to evaluate Mobile Strike Force (MSF) organizational and operational (O&O) concepts in the Operations Other Than War (OOTW) environments.

2. **References.**

a. Prairie Warrior/Mobile Strike Force (PW/MSF) 95 Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWE) Study Plan, TRAC-SP-0794, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC), Study and Analysis Center (SAC). October 1994.

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j. "Shoot Don't Shoot Rules of Engagement in Peacekeeping Operations." Cowdrey, C.B., SAMS, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. May 1994.

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3. Terms of reference.

a. Problem statement. Can a mobile strike force task-organized for combat perform operations other than war (OOTW) missions such as peace enforcement in the European Command (EUCOM) and Hurricane Andrew disaster relief without augmentation or reorganization? If not, what are the organizational or augmentation implications?

b. Background of problem. The United States is transitioning from the industrial age to the information age; from a cold war containment strategy to a regional force projection strategy; and from facing a clearly defined threat to being confronted by a myriad of ill-defined threats. This transition requires a top-to-bottom examination of the Army (Force XXI). Operations Other Than War covers a broad spectrum. OOTW are designed to promote regional stability, maintain or achieve democratic end states, retain U.S. influence and access abroad, provide assistance to distressed areas, protect U.S. interests, and assist U.S. civil authorities. Doctrine on OOTW is presented in FM 100-5, Operations. The manual lists 13 different OOTW activities. This study considers how MSF could, or should, be involved with two of these situations: peace enforcement and disaster relief.

c. Impact of problem. The impact is that, if an MSF task-organized for combat cannot perform OOTW operations without extensive augmentation or reorganization, the U.S. will have added another special purpose force that may not be able to contribute in the most frequent applications of U.S. power.

d. Objectives. ***"Is the Mobile Strike Force capable of performing Operations Other than War (OOTW) missions such as peace enforcement in EUCOM and disaster relief such as Hurricane Andrew?"*** This analysis will support the MSF O&O Analysis. Specifically, this analysis will help address the following objectives in OOTW situations.

(1) To assess division-level Force XXI design principles.

(2) To assess division-level Force XXI operational concepts.

(3) To assess division-level Force XXI combat service support (CSS) concepts and requirements.

e. Scope.

(1) This OOTW analysis is part of TRAC's evaluation of the MSF linked to the 1995 PRAIRIE WARRIOR (PW) exercise.

(2) The MSF alternatives examined will be equipped with 2010 technological capabilities as determined by the Battle Laboratory Integration and Technology for Combat Developments (BLITCD).

(3) Analyses conducted as part of this plan will focus on the MSF O&O concept.

(4) This analysis will focus on the OOTW areas of peace enforcement and disaster relief.

f. Assumptions.

(1) Projected 2010 technological capabilities are valid and data is available, or can be generated, to represent these capabilities.

(2) Threat organizational, materiel, and doctrinal projections are accurate for the 2010 time frame.

(3) Scenarios used in this analysis are representative of those in which a Force XXI division might be employed.

g. Constraint. The analysis will be limited to evaluation of MSF alternatives in peace enforcement and disaster relief scenarios.

h. Study issue.

(1) "Is the MSF capable of performing OOTW missions such as peace enforcement in EUCOM?"

(2) "Is MSF capable of conducting operations such as Hurricane Andrew disaster relief?"

i. Essential elements of analysis (EEA).

(1) Peace enforcement in EUCOM.

(a) EEA 1. How does the Army determine MSF composition requirements for a particular peace enforcement mission?

(b) EEA 2. What are the combat support requirements of MSF in peace enforcement operations?

(c) EEA 3. What are the command and control (C2) requirements of MSF in peace enforcement operations?

(d) EEA 4. What are the special equipment and procedure requirements of MSF in peace enforcement operations?

(e) EEA 5. What are the special liaison requirements of MSF in peace enforcement operations?

(f) EEA 6. What are the logistics implications of multinational peace enforcement operations on MSF?

- (g) EEA 7. How quickly can MSF units respond to a peace enforcement mission?
- (h) EEA 8. What are the sortie requirements to sustain an MSF unit?
- (i) EEA 9. What additional assets not organic to MSF are required for peace enforcement operations?
- (j) EEA 10. What are the rules of engagement issues in peace enforcement for MSF units?
- (k) EEA 11. What are the augmentation requirements for MSF peace enforcement operations?
- (l) EEA 12. How can MSF reduce risk and casualties?
- (m) EEA 13. How does MSF disengage from a peace enforcement operation?
- (2) Hurricane Andrew disaster relief. The EEAs listed for study issue 2 are to lead discussion in an OOTW MSF seminar workshop to evaluate the MSF capabilities in a Hurricane Andrew-style disaster relief effort.
 - (a) EEA 14. What is the determining process that dictates the uses of MSF for a disaster relief situation?
 - (b) EEA 15. What are the peculiar C2 requirements for MSF in disaster relief efforts?
 - (c) EEA 16. How do units composing the MSF train to prepare for disaster relief situations?
 - (d) EEA 17. How does MSF help provide medical and veterinary services, sanitation, and water purification services associated with disasters?
 - (e) EEA 18. What engineer assets does MSF require to do this mission?
 - (f) EEA 19. How does MSF provide help with public affairs, civil affairs, food services, supply distribution, and reestablishing an infrastructure after a disaster?

j. Method of analysis.

(1) General. The TRAC Scenario and Wargaming Center (SWC) will examine the MSF in an OOTW context. The MSF will have a peace enforcement mission in a EUCOM scenario and a disaster relief/humanitarian assistance mission in a Hurricane Andrew scenario. These two OOTW situations are independent and require different methodologies to evaluate MSF capabilities in these situations.

(2) Methodology. The methodology used for the MSF OOTW analysis (depicted in figure 1) divides the analysis into peace enforcement using existing scenarios with the Janus model and disaster relief analysis from an OOTW seminar workshop.




Figure 1. General methodology MSF OOTW

(a) Develop MSF OOTW study plan. This study plan divides the OOTW analysis into two sections with one looking at OOTW in a peace enforcement role and the other in a disaster relief situation.

(b) Develop peace enforcement from high-resolution scenarios (HRS) 49.0 and 50.0. TRAC-SWC will use approved scenarios (an Airborne Combat Team Early Entry EUCOM (HRS 49) and the follow-on mission of Airborne Combat Team Route Clearing (HRS 50)) to develop the concept to use a task-organized MSF in OOTW peace enforcement missions. The approved scenarios will serve as the reference or base case in determining initial locations, strengths, service support levels, and concept of the operation.

(c) Task-organized OOTW MSF concept. Using the MSF O&O concept, TRAC-SWC will develop a task organization of MSF and determine peace enforcement forces to be gamed. In this scenario, the MSF will be able to use its entire suite of 2010 technologies.

(d) Need additional systems? If MSF does not have organic systems to accomplish the mission, additional assets will be taken from the corps. Assets will be taken from the corps to supplement the task-organized MSF to provide systems to attain the units objective.

(e) Add needed corp assets. Needed assets not found organic in MSF are obtained from the corps. These systems will need to be identified and added to the Janus force file. If systems are added which represent new capabilities not already found in MSF, then additional data base work may be needed.

(f) Input task-organized OOTW MSF units into the two scenarios. Using the base case scenarios as a template, TRAC-SWC will modify the force files to represent the systems in the

task-organized MSF scenarios. The Janus force file will contain the MSF systems. These forces will have technological advantages over the systems portrayed in the base case scenarios.

(g) Combat modeling (Janus). Janus will be employed a second time by TRAC-SWC to execute the scenarios; however, the MSF will be used with its 2010 technologies. The modeling process will produce results that will capture the additional contribution of these technologies. The base case results will serve as the basis of comparison for the MSF scenarios.

(h) MSF OOTW comparison analysis. A TRAC-SAC analyst will collect data from the Janus runs to compare with the base case scenarios (the Airborne Combat Team Early Entry and the Airborne Combat Team Route Clearing). The purpose is to compare the overall force performance of the base case with those in the MSF task-organized structure.

(i) Is improvement possible? Comparing the results of the MSF task-organized scenario with the base case will determine if the force performance can be improved. These improvements may call for additional forces or less force, may adjust the timing on executing the operational plan, or tailoring the forces to better accomplish the goals of the scenario.

(j) Modify task-organized MSF. If it was determined by the analyst that improvements can be made, the MSF task organization will then be modified in the attempt to improve an aspect of the scenario, to include increased survivability, increased lethality, or necessary modification of the tempo at which the action takes place.

(k) Final analysis. Once it is determined that no additional improvements of MSF effectiveness can be made, a final analysis of all results will be made.

(l) Develop disaster relief events for seminar. The second part of the MSF OOTW analysis is to evaluate MSF in a disaster relief role. TRAC-SWC will conduct an OOTW seminar workshop to develop the third scenario in a trilogy of scenarios. This third scenario, Relief of Refugee Camp (HRS 51.0), will be the first part of the seminar. The second part of the seminar will look at how a task-organized MSF would respond in a disaster relief situation.

(m) Seminar: Employment of Task-Organized MSF. At the conclusion of the first part of the seminar (Relief of Refugee Camp (HRS 51.0)), the subject-matter experts (SME) from the various battle laboratories and schools will be introduced to MSF and asked how they would task-organize MSF to conduct the same operation of providing relief to a refugee camp. After this short exercise, a more in-depth look will be made as to how MSF should be task-organized to support a disaster relief situation such as Hurricane Andrew. The seminar participants will be given an event list of situations and asked, given their experiences and expertise, how they would task-organize MSF to meet the requirements on this list.

(n) OOTW analysis. At the conclusion of the seminar, TRAC-SAC will develop a OOTW disaster relief analysis comparing how units have been used with what experts think a task-organized MSF could provide.

(o) MSF OOTW study report. The MSF OOTW study report will be incorporated into the MSF 95 O&O Analysis final report. The OOTW report will combine the results of the Janus gaming of the two scenarios using MSF and the seminar result where SMEs were asked how MSF should be task-organized to best meet the requirements of a disaster.

(p) Scripted brief. TRAC-SWC will develop a scripted brief of the OOTW analysis which will be incorporated into the O&O analysis scripted brief due to BLITCD for the October 1995 Louisiana Maneuvers (LAM) Board of Directors (BOD) meeting.

k. Measures of effectiveness (MOE). The MSF examined by this analysis will be evaluated by measuring effects on the requirements, deployability, lethality, and survivability of the force as they apply to OOTW peace enforcement operations. The MOE and measures of performance (MOP) which follow are linked to the EEAs. Each MOE and MOP identifies the EEAs from study issue 1, with which it corresponds.

(1) The enemy systems that are most lethal to each Blue system. [EEAs 11 and 12]

(2) The measures that will improve survivability of Blue systems. [EEAs 11 and 12]

(3) The amount of time it takes Blue force to gain control of an airfield. [EEAs 1 and 7]

(4) The amount of coordination between MSF organizations to accomplish mission.
[EEAs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6]

(5) Capability of the force if not all assets survive initial deployment in terms of mobility, lethality, C2 assets, and combat support. [EEAs 11 and 12]

l. MOP.

(1) The number of sorties required to deploy MSF units. [EEA 7]

(2) The number of sorties required per day to sustain MSF after operations start. [EEA 8]

(3) The combat strength of the objectives packages in terms of key personnel and supplies for each day of the deployment schedule. [EEA 3 and 7]

(4) The organic transportation assets, including the number of resupply vehicles required for the Blue force. [EEAs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6]

(5) The number of units that are mobile with organic transportation and the number of units that can be moved with assets from other units. [EEAs 1, 9, and 11]

(6) Additional resources that are required to disengage from peace enforcement operations. [EEAs 1 and 13]

(7) The amount of time needed to disengage with low risk. [EEA 13]

4. Support and resource requirements.

a. Support requirements.

(1) TRAC-SWC will:

(a) Develop the EUCOM OOTW scenario and address MSF capability to respond to disaster relief situations.

(b) Conduct OOTW analysis to address study issues 1 and 2, and to provide analysis results to TRAC-SAC for certification and integration into the MSF 95 O&O Concept analysis report.

(2) TRAC-SAC will:

(a) Support OOTW analysis by participating in the conference and observing the constructive simulation efforts.

(b) Incorporate analysis into the MSF 95 O&O Concept analysis report.

(3) BLITCD will:

(a) Develop MSF 95 organizational design alternatives to enable the examination of Force XXI design principles.

(b) Identify the MSF 2010 technological capabilities to be included in the PW/MSF 95 AWE and be the sole authority for approval of any changes.

(c) Develop and gain approval of the Force XXI Division O&O Concept and assist BLITCD in developing the MSF 95 O&O Concept.

(d) Develop and gain approval of Force XXI design principles and specific design issues and assist in using them to develop MSF 95 design alternatives and issues for analysis by TRAC.

(4) Force Design Directorate (FDD), Combined Arms Center (CAC) will develop a detailed force structure.

(5) Combat Developments Directorate (CDD), CGSC will:

(a) Assist in the comparative analysis for the disaster relief and the evaluation of simulation results.

(b) Assist in the evaluation of MSF forces in a peace enforcement role.

will: (6) Threat Support Directorate, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT TSD)

- (a) Provide expertise on threat actions and responses.
- (b) Provide simulation support and evaluate analytical results.
- (c) Provide approved threat weapons list.

(7) TRAC-Operations Analysis Center (OAC) will:

- (a) Provide analyst to support the comparative analysis.
- (b) Use the Contingency Analysis Planning System (CAPS) to develop issues.
- (c) Provide approved friendly and threat system data for Janus modeling.

(8) TRAC-Technical Operations Directorate (TOD) will provide analyst to assist in resource allocations.

(9) TRAC-Fort Lee (LEE) will provide support logistics and augmentation analysis.

(10) Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), CGSC, will provide after-action reports for peace enforcement operations and Hurricane Andrew.

(11) Early Entry and Lethality Survivability Battle Laboratory (EELS BL) will:

- (a) Serve as standard scenario sponsor.
- (b) Provide insights to base case scenario development and answer modification questions.

b. Resource requirements. The following resources are estimated to be required from analysis organizations supporting this portion of PW/MSF 95 AWE analysis.

- TRAC-SWC: .5 PSY
- TRAC-SAC: .25 PSY
- DCSINT TSD: .25 PSY
- TRAC-OAC: .25 PSY
- TRAC-LEE: .25 PSY
- EELS BL: .25 PSY
- Others TBD for seminar workshop

c. Data requirements.

(1) The Data Development Directorate, TRAC-OAC, will provide the approved Blue and threat weapons system data either projected or surrogated for use in the constructive models used for this analysis.

(2) DCSINT TSD will provide the approved threat weapons list.

5. Administration.

a. Study title. Mobile Strike Force (MSF) Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Peace Enforcement and Disaster Relief Analysis.

b. Study organization. This study has been assigned to TRAC by the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General for Combined Arms. TRAC-SWC will lead the effort for the OOTW portion of the MSF 95 O&O Analysis.

c. Coordination. The study will be coordinated with all participating analytic agencies.

d. Study schedule.

(1) OOTW analysis plan approval	Apr 95
(2) OOTW scenario development	Jan 95 - Mar 95
(3) Model runs and analysis	Apr 95 - May 95
(4) Disaster Relief Analysis	May 95
(5) Scripted brief	Jun 95 - Jul 95
(6) Approval briefing	Aug 95

e. Point of contact. Mr. David Fuller, TRAC-SAC/SWC, DSN: 552-9141; e-mail: fuller@trac.army.mil.

APPENDIX C

LIST OF ACRONYMS

APPENDIX C

ACRONYMS

Abn/ABN	airborne
AGS	armored gun system
AIDS	Auto-Immunodeficiency Syndrome
AO	area of operations
AOE	Army of Excellence
AWE	advanced warfighting experiment
BDU	battle dress uniform
BLITCD	Battle Laboratory Integration and Technology Directorate, Combat Developments
Bn/bn	battalion
BCBL	Battle Command Battle Laboratory
BOD	board of directors
C2	command and control
CA	civil affairs
CGSC	U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
CINC	commander in chief
CS	combat support
CSS	combat service support
CSS BL	Combat Support Battle Laboratory
DCO	Defense Coordinating Officer
DoD	Department of Defense
EEA	essential elements of analysis
EUCOM	European Command (scenario)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FM	field manual
FMSO	Foreign Military Studies Office
HMMWV	high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle
JAG	judge advocate general
JRTC	Joint Readiness Training Center
JTF	joint task force

LAM	Louisiana Maneuvers
LEE	TRAC element at Fort Lee
LZ	landing zone
MKT	mobile kitchen trailer
MRE	meals, ready-to-eat
MP	military police
mph	miles per hour
MSF	Mobile Strike Force
OAC	Operations Analysis Center
OOTW	operations other than war
O&O	organizational and operational
PAO	Public Affairs Office/Officer
PETA	People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
PM	provost marshal
PSYOP	psychological operations
PW/MSF	Prairie Warrior/Mobile Strike Force
QRF	quick-reaction force
ROE	rules of engagement
SAC	Study and Analysis Center
SME	subject-matter expert
SWC	Scenarios and Wargaming Center
TRAC	TRADOC Analysis Center
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
TF	task force
UN	United Nations

APPENDIX D

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